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Abstract
Tracing is conceptualized as the "following" of an object through an exchange transaction and into the product
of that exchange. Why is this so and what are the consequences? This article argues that the presentation of
tracing in the metaphysical language of transmutation allows the doctrine to be depicted as consistent with
axiomatic notions of property that understand it as pre-political and that preclude judicial readjustment of
proprietary rights. However, the metaphysical conceptualization of tracing gives the remedy a conceptual
structure that has resulted in the doctrine developing dysfunctionally when compared with the normative
justifications that motivated its initial development. The reformation of the law of tracing necessitates
understanding property as a social construct-the type of shift in perception that took place in the United
States in the first half of this century. Signs of this understanding are apparent in the recent proprietary
remedies jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada.
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Tracing is conceptualized as the "following" of an
object through an exchange transaction and into the
product of that exchange. Why is this so and what are
the consequences? This article argues that the
presentation of tracing in the metaphysical language of
transmutation allows the doctrine to be depicted as
consistent with axiomatic notions of property that
understand it as pre-political and that preclude judicial
readjustment of proprietary rights. However, the
metaphysical conceptualization of tracing gives the
remedy a conceptual structure that has resulted in the
doctrine developing dysfunctionally when compared
with the normative justifications that motivated its
initial development. The reformation of the law of
tracing necessitates understanding property as a social
construct-the type of shift in perception that took
place in the United States in the first half of this
century. Signs of this understanding are apparent in
the recent proprietary remedies jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court of Canada.
Tracing, qui est le droit pr6vu en equity de rechercher
la trace de quelque chose, est d6fini comme le fait de
"suivre" un objet A travers une transaction d'6change et
A l'int6rieur du produit de cet 6change. Pourquoi est-ce
le cas, et quelles en sont les consequences? Cet article
soutient que la presentation de tracing dans le langage
m6taphysique de la transmutation effectue une
prdsentation de la doctrine qui est compatible avee des
notions axiomatiques de la propri~t6 comme 6tant pr6-
politique, et qui emp~chent le rajustement judiciaire
des droits de la propri~t6. Cependant, la definition de
tracing donne au recoursune structure conceptuelle qui
a promu le d~veloppement dysfonctionnel par rapport
aux justifications normatives qui ont 6t6 A l'origine de
son d~veloppement initial. La r~forme de la loi de
tracing exige une comprehension de la propri~t6
comme construction sociale - le genre de changement
de perception qui a eu lieu aux Etats-Unis au cours de
la premiere moiti6 de cc sice. Des signes de cette
approche sont 6vidents dans la jurisprudence r~cente
de la Cour supreme du Canada A l"'gard des recours
propri~taires.
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I. INTRODUCTION
B misappropriates thing 1 owned by A and gives it to C in
exchange for thing 2. Instead of bringing an action based on his title to
thing 1, A may assert title to thing 2. That we give property rights in
substitutes is itself of interest. Civil law jurisdictions, in contrast, do not
provide such a remedy.1 However, more striking is the way in which
rights to substitutes are explained in our legal discourse. According to
our law, as stated in Taylor v. Plumer, the plaintiff has rights in a
substitute because "if the property in its original ... form was [owned by
the plaintiff] no change of... form can divest it of that [interest]." 2 What
is more, the process of asserting rights to a substitute is described using
the metaphoric language of "tracing" and "following." This article asks:
First, why does our legal culture favour a metaphysical account of this
I A. Gambaro, "Property" in A. Gambaro, A. Candian & B. Pozzo, Property, Proprit,
Eigentum (Padova: Cedam, 1992) 1 at 7-9.
2 (1815), 3 M. & S. 562 at 575, 105 E.R. 721 at 726, Lord Ellenborough [hereinafter Taylor
cited to M. & S.].
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remedy, rather than a more prosaic description? And second, and
perhaps more importantly, what are the consequences of this approach?
Tracing discourse can be understood only if one grasps the
problems that are central to the justification of the remedy. In
particular, an understanding of the work being done by "tracing"
rhetoric requires an appreciation of the predominance in our legal
culture of a conception of property as the enforcement of pre-existing
and inviolable rights in a single thing3 Functionally, tracing can only
properly be regarded as a remedy which gives rise to new property
rights-an understanding that cannot easily be reconciled with
traditional notions of property.: This, I argue, explains the rather bizarre
conceptualization of tracing in our legal discourse. The traditional
analysis of tracing as the following of things is imbued with metaphysical
rhetoric which serves to obscure the dissonance between a doctrine that
provides for the creation of new property rights and the orthodox
paradigm of property.
Is there really any harm in this? Fictions and related devices
have often been praised for assisting legal development. According to
this view, deceit in the form of the law is seen as a small price to pay for
positive change in the law's substantive effect. In fact, form and
substance are too interdependent to support this conclusion. The
obfuscatory concepts developed in this area have their own logic that will
at times demand results which diverge from sound normative
justifications for the doctrine. In attempting to mediate the apparent
incongruity of tracing doctrine and axiomatic notions of property rights,
our judges and jurists have failed to address fundamental issues of
desert. The primary advantage of tracing is that it confers priority in
bankruptcy4-an effect which is not easily justified.5 However the
property rhetoric employed in this area to suppress the redistributive
nature of "tracing" has discouraged the courts from seeking to mould a
3 For an account of the development and continuing influence of these ideas, see P. Stein,
"The General Notions of Contract and Property in Eighteenth Century Scottish Thought" (1963) 8
Judd. Rev. 1.
4 Tracing in equity provides that the defendant holds the asset in question as a constructive
trustee for the plaintiff, who is the beneficial owner of the asset. Common law tracing allows
plaintiffs to bring personal actions for conversion, detinue, or money had and received. It is
generally thought that if the plaintiff can show that assets subject to a tracing claim passed into the
hands of the representative of the insolvent, a personal right of action lies against the
representative-effectively giving the plaintiff priority over general creditors; see M. Scott, "The
Right to 'Trace' at Common Law" (1966) 7 West. Aust. L. Rev. 463 at 480.
5 For a review of priority-creating proprietary remedies, see S. Walt & E.L. Sherwin,
"Contribution Arguments in Commercial Law" (1993) 42 Emory L.J. 897 at 934-67.
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remedy which allocates entitlements within limits dictated by some
defensible normative rationale. In particular, the metaphysical rhetoric
of tracing encourages judges and jurists to ignore the consequences of
proprietary relief on third parties and rely instead on the ultimately
circuitous assertion that the plaintiff is entitled to proprietary relief
because the contested asset is his or her property.
Finally, I shall examine changing understandings about property
in the United States and Canada. First, I briefly explore the way in
which the meaning of property has changed quite markedly in American
legal discourse in the last sixty years. Second, and more specifically, I
take account of developments in Canadian jurisprudence on proprietary
remedies in the last two decades. Both examples suggest a move away
from the traditional paradigm-a move which I suggest is necessary if we
are going to address the dysfunction in the positive law of tracing. What
is required is a more open legal discourse. This can only follow a move
beyond our commitment to a paradigm of property as being the absolute
ownership of things. Beginning with an acknowledgement of the reality
that our law already provides numerous instances where property rights
are readjusted, we might begin to develop principles justifying
divergences from the orthodox understanding of property-a
jurisprudence building the basis upon which new property rights can
legitimately be created and existing rights qualified.
II. THE ORTHODOX PARADIGM OF PROPERTY
This article advances the view that much which is perplexing in
tracing discourse can be understood when we appreciate the constraints
imposed upon us by understandings of property that we treat as
axiomatic. The law in this area cannot be explained without first
comprehending the meaning ascribed to and the function performed by
"property" in our legal discourse.6 One particular difference in the use
of the term "property" is crucial in this context. On the one hand,
"property" can be understood as simply being those rules making up the
"law 'of property;" rules established as the consequence of relatively
specific deliberations concerning the entitlement to resources.
According to this view, "property" refers simply to those rules which
6 In this context, I can offer no more than a sketch of our understanding of property and its
role in our legal culture, along with a few examples of how this understanding manifests itself in
practice. Ultimately, it is only through case studies such as those presented here-explorations of
property discourse in the context of particular problems of resource allocation-that we can build
an understanding of the role of property in our legal culture.
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deal with a particular area of social life-this use does not imply the
existence of some fundamental unitary conception of property. If,
however, a relatively coherent conception of property exists, it is to be
found through a process of induction, by examining the more concrete
rules of our legal system. On the other hand, "property" can be
perceived as a concept which has a fundamental normative role in a legal
system; a concept from which can be deduced the more particular rules
of a given legal system. 7 According to this view, we do have an abstract
conception of "property" from which can be deduced the rules governing
the allocation of resources in more specific instances. Which of these
understandings better characterizes "property" in common law thinking?
Is it true, as Jeremy Waldron suggests, that a given legal culture's
"particular conception of ownership [is] constituted by the property rules
of the legal system?" 8 Or, to the contrary, is it the case that a legal
culture's conception of ownership constitutes its system's property rules?
It is central to the thesis developed in this article that the latter view is
closer to the truth than is generally thought.
It has long been a feature of our legal tradition that property has
been associated with the notion of the enforcement of pre-existing and
inviolable rights over distinct things. Property is understood as a set of
established entitlements delimiting the bounds of legitimate state power
and thus providing a sphere of freedom for the individual. The notion of
a judiciary concerned only with the protection of pre-existing
entitlements relies on the image of property as a boundary.9 This
understanding of property is central to many of the predominant strains
of modern English political theory.O It is an ideal enshrined in
constitutional provisions which provide that the legislatures may not
deprive individuals of their property rights without giving compensation.
Similarly, for the citizen, the restrictions which property imposes on the
judiciary serve to delineate a zone of personal freedom from other
7The distinction can be described as reasoning from the "top down" (deductively) or from the
"bottom up" (inductively): see generally R.A. Posner, "Legal Reasoning from the Top Down and
From the Bottom Up: The Question of Unenumerated Constitutional Rights" (1992) 59 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 433. For a discussion of the level of abstraction in the context of property, see M.J. Radin,
Reinterpreting Property (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993) at 98.
8 j. Waldron, The Right to Private Property (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988) at 52.
9 See, generally, J.N. Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism:
The Madisonian Framework and its Legacy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
10 H.T. Dickinson, Liberty and Property: Political Ideology in Eighteenth-centuty Britain
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1977) at 310; and P. Stein & J. Shand, Legal Values in Western
Society (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 1974) at 207-11.
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individuals.11 It explains the understanding that property in a particular
object can be redistributed only through consensual transfer. 12
This understanding of property has also provided a basis in
Anglo-American common law for delimiting the power of the judiciary
and thereby distinguishing the province of the courts from that of the
legislature. According to this vision, the judicial role involves the
enforcement of a pre-existing set of entitlements-the maintenance of a
natural order. The judiciary's function is to implement corrective
justice. Distributive justice is the preserve of the legislature.13 As long
as the judiciary keeps within the framework of corrective justice
provided by the principles of private property and freedom of contract,
its decisions are understood to be legal rather than political. This
conception of property has enabled the common law to be conceived of
as apolitical and allowed the Anglo-American legal culture to maintain
its faith in the rule of law despite the presence of a judiciary with
law-making powers. While, this understanding of property still
dominates English law, it has lost much of its power in American legal
thought. Canadian law, too, is moving away from the traditional
paradigm of property as absolute thing-ownership. However, in order to
understand tracing discourse, one must study it in the context of the
paradigm of property that shaped its development.
The conventional understanding of property as the absolute
ownership of particular objects can best be witnessed at work in cases
where the judiciary is asked to readjust proprietary entitlements in a
manner that conflicts with the orthodox paradigm. Here courts will
often invoke axiomatic notions of property to provide normative
guidance in the resolution of a dispute over rights to possess and use
11 This may be contrasted with the limits that property is seen to impose on the legislature,
which are understood to mark the boundary between the citizen and state.
12 See, for example, Sir W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (facsimile of
first edition 1765-1769, reprinted 1979) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979) vol. 2 at
200-01. Similarly, modern jurists regard immunity from expropriation as a fundamental feature of
property. See, for example, A.M. Honor6, "Ownership" in A.G. Guest, ed., Oxford Essays in
Jurisprudence.A Collaborative Work (London: Oxford University Press, 1961) 107 at 119; and R.A.
Epstein, Takings: Private Property and The Power of Eminent Domain (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1985) at 304.
13 See M.J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law: 1780-1860 (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1977) at 256, for a discussion of this understanding in American
constitutional law. For a contemporary defence of such a vision of the common law as apolitical,
see E.J. Weinrib, "Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law" (1988) 97 Yale LJ. 949
at 985-1000.
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resources.14 In Shelfer v. City of London Electric Lighting Co.,1S the
English Court of Appeal was asked to refrain from enjoining the
defendant's electricity generating operation which was interfering with
the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his land. The defendant asked that
the plaintiff instead be limited to an award of damages to compensate
him for his loss. The widespread use of the injunction in nuisance cases
was still less than a century old and the scope of the remedy had yet to
be decisively determined.1 6 The Court rejected the defendant's plea,
concluding that limiting the plaintiff to damages would amount to a
taking of property rights-an impermissible result. Lindley L.J.
concluded that "[e]xpropriation, even for a money consideration, is only
justified where Parliament has sanctioned it."17 It is apparent that the
Court of Appeal reached its conclusion that what was asked involved an
imposition on the plaintiffs property rights by starting from the premise
that those rights were absolute.
More recently, in Gissing v. GissinglS the House of Lords
rejected a wife's claim for a proprietary interest in the matrimonial
home. Lord Morris argued that "[a]ny power in the court to alter
ownership must be found in statutory enactment."1 9 Once again the
nature of "property" and its role in delimiting the province of the
judiciary from that of the legislature was assumed without discussion. A
few years later, in Mooigate Mercantile Ltd. v. Twitchings,20 the House of
Lords considered Whether the defendant, the owner of a motor vehicle
actually in the possession of another person, under a hire-purchase
agreement, might lose his title to the vehicle after failing to register its
interest and the hirer had sold the car to the plaintiff. Lord Fraser, in
denying the plaintiffs claim for the car, argued that "an owner of
property is entitled to be careless with it if he likes."21 According to this
view, from the fact of ownership certain conclusions inexorably follow.
In this instance, in Lord Fraser's view at least, it was axiomatic that
14 See also G. Samuel, "Property Notions in the Law of Obligations" (1994) 53 Cambridge L.J.
524 at 539.
15 [1895] 1 Ch. 287 [hereinafter Shelfer].
16 j.p.S. MeLaren, "Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution-Some Lessons from Social
History" (1983) 3 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 155.
17 Shelfer, supra note 15 at 316.
IS [1971] A.C. 886 [hereinafter Gissing].
19 Ibid. at 898.
20 [1977] A.C. 890.
21 Ibid. at 925.
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property could pass only with consent. Once again, the meaning of
property as the absolute ownership of a thing was assumed as fixed.
Herein lies the problem with tracing and other doctrines which
provide for the readjustment of proprietary rights and so run counter to
the conventional paradigm of property. How do we account for the
presence of such doctrines when the understanding of property that runs
deep in our legal culture should preclude their existence? The answer
lies in an understanding of the rhetorical strategies pursued in
conceptualization of these doctrines. It is for this reason that this article
now turns to an examination of tracing discourse.
III. TRACING DISCOURSE
A. Tracing as a Property-Creating Remedy: A Functional Analysis
Jurists frequently suggest that tracing is not remedial in any real
sense.22 Rather, the argument goes, tracing and the constructive trust
"are not so much remedies as part of the process of establishing the
substantive rights of the parties."23 The dichotomy upon which this
argument relies is misconceived. Tracing is a remedy that establishes
substantive rights or, to put it another way, its remedy is substantive
rights. The remedy conferred in the exercise of tracing is ownership
(legal or equitable). We normally think of the institution of property in
terms of the vindication of existing rights. For this reason, we are
inclined to infer that tracing is not essentially remedial. Thus, jurists
conclude that tracing is a way of "establishing" the plaintiffs property
rights, in the sense of adducing facts to prove that he or she has
particular rights. According to this view, tracing is not a remedy but an
evidential principle.24 However, tracing also entails to the plaintiff
"establishing" rights, in the sense of creating a new legal relation.
Tracing is the exercise by the plaintiff of a power to change his or her
legal position and, in so doing, that of the defendant. This process
22 Thus the constructive trust and tracing were described as "spurious equitable remedies":
R.E. Megarry & P.V. Baker, eds., Snell's Principles ofEquity, 27th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell,
1973) at 572.
23 Ibid.
24 Thus one commentator argues of tracing: "It is a preliminary evidential step by which the
plaintiff proves the elements of a cause of action. It allows him to establish facts which will entitle
him to enforce a right conferred by some rule of substantive law": D. Fox, Tracing Money at
Common Law (Ph.D. Thesis, Cambridge University, 1995) at 2 [unpublished].
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allows the plaintiff to enjoy those rights conventionally associated with
the institution of ownership. 25 It is this process that gives tracing its
remedial character.
How then might it be said that the exercise of the power to trace,
which results in a new legal relationship, is not remedial in some
important sense? Much of the discussion of the issue turns on the
question of when the plaintiffs proprietary interest arises. There is a
tendency to regard the title conferred through the tracing exercise as
arising automatically at the time of the exchange in question.26 Rather
than envisaging the right in question as one requiring the courts to
impose a legal relationship on the parties, jurists generally prefer to
regard this relationship as commencing from the time that the events
give rise to the tracing claim. Nothing much should turn on the
distinction. Perhaps it arises from a rather romantic picture of the
law-a picture that emphasizes that the courts are enforcing our
subsisting rights rather than using their power to intervene in our lives.
The idea that a legal relationship arises automatically gives the
reasoning a rather metaphysical quality, suggesting that the legal
relationship at issue is almost a natural state of affairs-one somehow
not involving the courts. However, ultimately the debate is a rather arid
one. The proprietary interest conferred by tracing is a legal construct; as
such, it arises when the courts say it does. Characterizing the interest as
arising automatically does not indicate that it is not a remedy. All that it
means is that the courts have stipulated that the remedy is effective as
soon as the particular events that precipitate the cause of action occur.
An automatic right nonetheless implies a remedy.27
If the title conferred in the tracing process is to be regarded as
not being remedial in any meaningful sense, it must be because the
plaintiffs interest in the assets in question existed prior to the facts
giving rise to the cause of action. Thus, a distinction may be made
between causes of action that enforce and causes of action that establish
a legal relationship between the plaintiff and an asset. The crucial
distinction is that, while in the first category the cause of action arises
out of the legal relationship, in the second the legal relationship arises
25 This is most obvious in the two-stage process involved in common law tracing. The plaintiff
must first trace to establish a proprietary relationship with the substitute. Thereupon, on the basis
of this relationship, the plaintiff is'entitled to bring common law actions such as trover, money had
and received, and conversion.
26 Cave v. Cave (1880), 15 Ch.D. 639 (Ch.).
27 C. Rotherham, "The Redistributive Constructive Trust: 'Confounding Ownership with
Obligation'?" (1992) 5 Cant. L. Rev. 84.
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out of the cause of action. An example of the first type of action is
trespass. There the cause of action is grounded upon a pre-existing right
to exclude others from entering onto the land in question. Tracing, by
contrast, must fall in the second category, given that the plaintiffs
interest in a substitute can arise, at the earliest, only at the time of the
event conferring the right to trace (that event being the exchange
transaction).28
In fact, it is implausible to regard tracing as involving the
vindication of a fully fledged property right-even one that arises only at
the time of the exchange transaction. This is because of the problem
Birks has termed the "geometric multiplication of the plaintiff's
property."29 An advantage of tracing claims is that they allow plaintiffs a
cause of action against more than one defendant. Plaintiffs may assert
their title against anyone holding assets which were taken from them.
Alternatively plaintiffs may "trace" their title into the exchange product
of subsequent transactions. Consider an example where a car owned by
A is stolen by B and then sold to C, who is aware of A's interest. A may
assert his or her title against C in respect of the car. However, A cannot
simultaneously assert title against more than one defendant. Plaintiffs
must elect against whom they will proceed 3 0 Because A cannot be
simultaneously the owner of both the original thing and the substitute, it
cannot be plausibly argued that, prior to A's election to trace, a full-
blown proprietary interest arises in respect of the proceeds of sale held
by B. Prior to tracing, B has a defeasible title to the proceeds of the
sale-a title that he is liable to lose if A elects to claim title to those
proceeds. If A has an interest arising automatically, at the most it can be
characterised as an "inchoate" property right-what is termed a "mere
equity" rather than a full proprietary interest.3 1 Hence the problem
faced in the context of tracing. It involves the creation of a property
right and, as a corollary, contemplates the qualification of existing
property rights. As such, it is difficult to reconcile with the
understanding of property which has long dominated our legal culture.
28 See, for example, lc Minerals Ltd v. International Corona Resources Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R.
574 at 676-77, La Forest J. [hereinafter L4CMinerals], discussed in text accompanying infra note 116.
29 P. Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, rev. ed. (Toronto: Oxford University
Press, 1989) at 92 and 394.
30 See A. Burrows, "Introduction" in A. Burrows, ed., Essays' on the Law of Restitution
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1991) 1 at 66.
31 See, for example, A.R. Everton, "'Equitable Interests' and 'Equities'-In Search of a
Pattern" (1976) 40 Cony. & Prop. Law. 209.
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B. The Metaphysics of Tracing: The Denial of the Remedial Nature of
Tracing in Formal Legal Discourse
While, functionally, tracing can only be understood as giving rise
to, rather than enforcing, a proprietary relationship between the plaintiff
and the asset in question, the conventional description of the doctrine is
rather different. In Taylor,32 the respondent had given his broker money
to buy Exchequer bills. The broker instead used the money to buy
bullion and securities for his own purposes and then absconded. The
Court held that Plumer could claim title over the bullion and securities.
Lord Ellenborough explained the matter in the following way:
It should seem that if the property in its original state and form was covered with a trust
in favour of the principal, no change of that state or form can divest it of such trust, or
give the factor or those who represent him in right any more valid claim in respect of it,
than they respectively had before such change.
The property of a principal entrusted to him by his factor for any special purpose belongs
to the principal, notwithstanding any change which that property may have undergone in
its point of form, so long as such property is capable of being identified and distinguished
from all other property.33
One particular ambiguity in the use of "property" in legal
discourse has long been noted.34 As in common speech, often the term
is used in legal discourse to indicate not the juridical relationship, but
the object of that relationship-the thing which is owned. Lord
Ellenborough uses "property" in this sense, while he refers to the legal
relationship using the concepts of trust and belongingness. Accordingly,
Lord Ellenborough's conclusion that the plaintiffs "property" persists
through exchange transactions is somewhat bizarre as it contemplates
that it is not the legal relationship but the object of that
relationship-the "thing" itself-that transcends substitutions.35 In this
way, tracing is explained on the basis that substitutions are the property
of the plaintiff, rather than as a rule that alters the parties' rights and
obligations in relation to the asset in question. Lord Ellenborough's
metaphysical explanation for property rights in substitutes is difficult to
reconcile with the fact that the plaintiff continues to have property rights
3 2 Supra note 2.
3 3 Ibid. at 575.
34 See, for example, J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,
J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart, eds., (London: Methuen, 1982) at 211.
35 Tracing is still generally analyzed in these terms: see, for example, A.J. Oakley, "Proprietary
Claims and Their Priority in Insolvency" (1995) 54 Cambridge L.J. 377 at 378-79.
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over the thing originally owned and that the defendant has title to the
asset in question until the plaintiff elects to trace.
In an important twentieth-century tracing decision, Re Diplock's
Estate,3 6 the English Court of Appeal similarly explained tracing in
transcendental terms. Delivering the judgment of the Court, Lord
Greene M.R. reasoned that where a plaintiff claims property purchased
out of a fund into which the plaintiff can trace: the availability of
"equitable remedies presuppose[s] the continued existence of the money
... as latent in property acquired by means of such a fund."37 Quite how
that which was originally owned by a plaintiff comes to be "latent" in
another thing, or even-where there has been a chain of
transactions-in a number of things, is obscure to say the least.
C. The Reconciliation of Tracing with Axiomatic Notions of
Property Rights
How are we to understand the manifest dissonance between a
functional understanding of tracing as a property-creating right and the
description of the device in formal legal discourse? Exploring the
function which various obfuscatory devices perform in western legal
culture, Lon Fuller concluded that fictions and similar devices serve to
reconcile legal rules and decisions with the premises to which a legal
culture is committed.38 Where a decision diverges from a fundamental
premise, rather than questioning the validity of the premise, judges and
jurists will manipulate the formal expression of the decision so as to
suppress the reality of that divergence. Tracing may readily be
understood in these terms.
Thus it may be understood that the* law often maintains
consistency with the conventional paradigm of property in form rather
than in substance. If the need to provide for a readjustment of
proprietary interests is felt sufficiently strongly it will be achieved
through a mode of conceptualization which does not advert to that
readjustment. This may be done through legal fictions, such as implied
contract. Often it will be done through evidential devices. Thus, the
doctrine of prescription incorporated the notion of a "presumed lost
36 [1948] Ch. 465.
3 7 ibid. at 521.
38 L.L. Fuller, Legal Fictions (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967) at 51-53. For an
account of academic views on the legal fiction from Bentham to Fuller, see L. Harmon, "Falling off
the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of Substituted Judgment" (1990) 100 Yale L.J. at 1-16.
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grant" which suggested that it was essentially concerned with the
consensual transfer of property.39 Estoppels may be used to prevent
owners from relying on their rights without requiring that those rights be
formally qualified.40 Obfuscatory devices will even be piled upon one
another if needed to preserve the formal integrity of the law. Thus, the
law will presume that, quite contrary to reality, a fiduciary who has
received a bribe did not intend to benefit personally, but rather intended
to hold the property in trust for his or her principal. The law will
additionally use the equitable maxim that "equity treats as done that
which ought to be done" in order to find that the assets in question are
the property of the principal. 41
Viewed functionally, tracing is obviously difficult to reconcile
with the conventional paradigm of property.42 The power to create new
property rights, which tracing provides, runs contrary to orthodox
notions of property. This explains the obfuscatory analysis favoured in
tracing jurisprudence. The traditional conceptualization of tracing
suppresses the reality of a divergence from axiomatic understandings of
property rights. Lord Ellenborough's conception of things transmuting
through exchange transactions serves to obscure the fact that legal rights
are altered when something is traced. The word "tracing" itself provides
a suggestive metaphor which implies that the plaintiff has an
unproblematic claim to relief. The metaphors of "following" and
"tracing" suggest there really is something being "traced"-some
essence to which title attaches. These metaphors operate "to treat as
fixed and natural things which are historically contingent and for which
human agents are responsible." 4 3 In this way, what is transitory is
eternalized. 44 More than mere rhetoric, they serve the important
function of maintaining the pretence of law's autonomy from politics. A
39 See Blackstone, supra note 12 at 263-66. See also A.W.B. Simpson, A History of the Land
Law, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986) at 109.
40 See J. Nicholson, "Owning and Owing: In What Circumstances Will the Responsibilities of
Ownership Preclude or Postpone the Assertion of the Rights of an Owner?" (1988) 16 Melbourne
Univ. L. Rev. 784.
41 A.G. Hong Kong v. Reid, [1994] 1 A.C. 324 (P.C.) [hereinafter Reid]. See also C.
Rotherham, "Proprietary Relief for Enrichment by Wrongs: Some Realism About Property Talk"
(1996) 19 U.N.S.W. L.J. 378 at 390-97.
42 See supra notes 9-21 and accompanying text.
43 D.E. Cooper, Metaphor, Aristotelian Society Series, vol. 5 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986) at
42.
44 See R. Barthes, Mythologies, trans. A. Lavers (Hammersmith, U.K.: Paladin, 1973) at 129
and 142, discussed ibid at 41ff.
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departure from the conventional paradigm of property that suggests a
shift from corrective justice (the province of the judiciary) into
distributive justice (the province of the legislature) is obscured by
"tracing" reasoning which presents the process as involving the
observance of existing entitlements rather than as a redistribution of the
parties' rights and obligations.
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF TRACING DISCOURSE ON THE
SUBSTANTIVE LAW
Should we be concerned that there is something nonsensical or
even fraudulent about much of "tracing" discourse? Does it do any
harm? Many of those who have examined fictions and related
obfuscatory devices have done so with a benevolent eye.45 The following
section suggests that in fact there are dangers inherent in the use of
obfuscatory devices generally, and it can be seen that the notion of
"tracing" has affected the way in which we think about the problems
associated with the distribution of entitlements in this field. Considering
the normative rationale for allowing an owner to claim the exchange
product of a transfer involving his assets, and asking whether the
constraints imposed upon the tracing remedy by virtue of treating it as
the following of things through transactions are in harmony with this
rationale, I conclude that there is a substantial dissonance between the
substantive law of tracing and any plausible justification for the remedy.
Finally, a brief consideration of the judicial enforcement of consensually
created tracing rights is offered to emphasize the way in which "tracing"
discourse encourages the development of the doctrine in dysfunctional
directions.
A. The Dangers of the Metaphysics of Tracing
The suppression of the divergence between the law in action and
premises to which a legal culture pays lip service means that the question
of whether that divergence is legitimate is never addressed. Thus, when
the court is asked to extend the institution of property to a novel
situation one might expect a normative argument-a justification of why
the advantages of proprietary protection should be conferred in this
45 A notable exception is Jeremy Bentham: see G.J. Postema, Bentham and the Common Law
Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986) at 271-75; and Harmon, supra note 38 at 3-5.
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context. Instead, the use of metaphysical justification-the argument
that something simply is property-stifles any comprehensive
consideration of how the interest in question ought to be protected. The
elevation of obfuscatory notions such as "tracing" to the "heaven of legal
concepts," 46 encourages the interpretation and development of doctrine
in terms of the logic of abstract legal concepts rather than
instrumentally. Useful as they might be in allowing the courts to achieve
desired outcomes in particular cases, formal concepts such as "tracing,"
when employed to obscure, have a logic of their own. Accordingly, when
applied in future cases, these concepts are liable to dictate results which
cannot be reconciled with the normative considerations that motivated
their initial use. The consequence is dysfunctional law.47
How then has thinking about substituted title in terms of
"tracing" affected the substantive law? Two approaches to tracing have
competed for acceptance. "Form-to-form tracing" (also known as
"exchange-product tracing" and "transactional tracing") provides for
title to be "followed" into the product of a transaction in which the thing
originally owned was exchanged. Thus the right to trace depends on the
ability of plaintiffs to point to an unbroken transactional chain between
their original asset and the particular asset in respect of which
proprietary relief is sought. This can be contrasted with the "swollen
assets" or "causal" approach to tracing,48 which focuses on giving a
plaintiff priority in bankruptcy to the extent that it can be proven that an
insolvent's estate is "swollen" by an enrichment gained at the expense of
the plaintiff. Proponents of swollen assets tracing are not concerned
with identifying the particular product of exchanges involving a
46 Compare R. Von Jhering, "In the Heaven of Legal Concepts" trans. E. Lowenstein in M.R.
Cohen & F.S. Cohen, eds., Readings in Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy (Boston: Little, Brown,
1951) at 678.
47 On the prevalence of this phenomenon, see A. Watson, "Legal Change: Sources of Law and
Legal Culture" in A. Watson, ed., Legal Origins and Legal Change (London: Hambledon, 1991) 69 at
82. For a discussion of this problem in relation to property discourse, see F. Cohen,
"Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach" (1935) 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809 at 815; and
D. Stevens, "Restitution, Property and the Cause of Action in Unjust Enrichment: Getting By With
Fewer Things" (1989) 39 U.T.L.J. 258 at 277-78. For an illustration in the context of the
development of the constructive trust, see J.P. Dawson, Unjust Enrichment: A Comparative.Analysis
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1951) at 26-33.
48 For a good account of swollen assets theory and for references to the extensive literature on
tracing theory prior to the victory of orthodoxy in the Restatement of Restitution § 202 (1937)
[hereinafter Restatement of Restitution], see D.A. Osterle, "Deficiencies of the Restitutionary Right
to Trace Misappropriated Property in Equity and in UCC § 9-306" (1983) 68 Cornell L. Rev. 172 at
189.
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plaintiffs property and are thus more willing to grant a charge over an
insolvent's assets generally.
The analysis of tracing as the following of a thing through
changes of form inexorably leads to the assumption that the swollen
assets justification for tracing is illogical. Thus, opposing a swollen asset
approach to the determination of entitlement to proprietary relief,
Andrew Burrows argues that "without the ownership link, the personal
remedy only is justified."49 The writer appears to assume that a
transactional link, in itself, somehow indicates ownership in some
pre-legal sense. Yet the "ownership link" is provided by the law; it is not
an independent social fact. Why would a causal link between the asset
originally owned by the plaintiff and the defendant's net wealth not
provide just as valid an "ownership link?" The revision of property
rights implicit in tracing was motivated by functional reasons-largely to
confer priority. While justice might demand limitations on form-to-form
tracing as a basis for recovery,5 0 the effort to portray tracing as the
following of title has led to the ignoring of the normative rationale of
tracing. Where this occurs, and the right to trace is explained in terms of
a reified "ownership link," form-to-form tracing is inevitably regarded as
a necessary and sufficient basis for asserting title, while swollen assets
tracing theory is considered arbitrary.s! David Paciocco, for instance,
concludes,
So long as the constructive trust is a remedy attaching to particular property and creating
rights to that property in the plaintiff, it would be arbitrary to select simply a particular
item of property and impose upon it a constructive trust. Why that property and not
49 See Burrows, supra note 30 at 44.
50 Infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
51 This can be seen in a recent article on tracing, where Lionel Smith criticizes Dale Osterle's
promotion of swollen assets tracing: see Osterle, supra note 48. Smith states that, "[t]his
unorthodox view appears to be based on a misunderstanding ... [since] proprietary rights must have
a specific subject matter": see L. Smith, "Tracing Into the Payment of A Debt" (1995) 54
Cambridge L.J. 290 at 296. He cites the Privy Council decision in Re Goldcorp Exvchange [1994] 3
W.L.R. 199 [hereinafter Re Goldcorp] as authority; see infra note 72. Smith's criticism is
misconceived. Whether proprietary rights need to have a specific subject matter is the very issue of
this debate. Osterle's argument is a normative one and does not claim to be based on an
interpretation of the positive law. Consequently, this argument can be countered only by reason,
not precedent. Osterle's argument that proprietary rights should indeed be available over a
defendant's assets generally cannot be shown to be "based on a misunderstanding" by a Privy
Council decision holding that they should not. Smith's view that "proprietary rights must have a
specific subject matter" suggests a commitment to an orthodox, physicalist conception of property.
Clearly this understanding is directly challenged by swollen assets theory. In reality, however, this
understanding of property is compromised even by form-to-form tracing.
[VOL 34 No. 2
1996] The Metaphysics of Tracing 337
other property? There is an undeniable allure in ensuring that a plaintiff who is given a
claim to particular property as a matter of remedy, has a claim as a matter of fact.52
Paciocco does not pay sufficient regard to the function of tracing.
He fails to appreciate that, without a theory of moral desert for priority,
it remains arbitrary to award a proprietary interest on the basis of a
transactional link. Why does a transactional link give a claim as "a
matter of fact" while a causal link focusing more directly on the
defendant's wealth does not?
The metaphysical approach to tracing results in a vicious
circularity in jurists' attempts to justify the doctrine. An example is a
defence of conventional tracing doctrine by Austin Scott, commentator
for the Restatement of Restitution.53 Scott argued that "[i]t is immaterial
that the wrongdoer is insolvent, for his creditors, not being purchasers
for value, are not entitled to any interest in the claimant's property or
product."5 4 This is a non sequitur; the argument leaves one of its
premises unstated. The claims of the creditors can only be ignored if
one assumes the very matter at issue-that the claimant has a
proprietary interest in the product of his property. Thus Scott's
argument is circular-the court recognizes the product of the exchange
as the plaintiffs property because it is the plaintiffs property.55 Some
sixty years ago, the American legal realist Felix Cohen characterized
such reasoning as "transcendental nonsense." 56 In the absence of prior
recognition, there is nothing that gives a particular relationship a quality
52 D.M. Paciocco, "The Remedial Constructive Trust: A Principled Basis for Priorities over
Creditors" (1989) 68 Can. Bar Rev. 315 at 333.
53 Scott's preference for transactional tracing over the competing theory of swollen assets
tracing found its form in Restatement of Restitution,supra note 48.
54 A.W. Scott & A.W. Scott Jr., The Law of Trust: Select cases and other authorities on the law
of trusts, 5th ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966) § 508, para. 3573.
55 This sort of circularity is pervasive in tracing jurisprudence. An example of this is Burrows'
"ownership link" justification for form-to-form tracing: see Burrows, supra note 30, and text
accompanying supra note 49. Similarly, R.M. Goode, "Property and Unjust Enrichment" in
Burrows, supra note 30, 215 at 220, argues that the approach which he advocates, requiring the
plaintiff to have a "proprietary base" in order to be entitled to an automatic property interest, is
"not only logical but responsive to policy considerations, for to require D to make over that which
never belonged to him but was always beneficially owned by P does not diminish D's estate and thus
has no impact on his creditors ..... ".Once again, property is presented as having normative force
when it is in reality a conclusion. See also R.M. Goode, "Ownership and Obligation in Commercial
Transactions" (1987) 103 L.Q. Rev. 433 at 439-41. For similar reasoning, see Oakley, supra note 35
at 377.
56 See Cohen, supra note 47 at 814-17. For a similar view, in the context of equitable
proprietary rights, see E.J. Weinrib, "The Fiduciary Obligation" (1975) 25 U.T.L.J. I at 10-11.
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of "propertyness" which requires its recognition as property.5  The
concept of property has to be constructed; it has no natural bounds.
The metaphors of "tracing" and "following" provide a structure
for our thought about substituted title.58 We have become so used to
thinking about this issue in terms of "tracing" that it is difficult for us to
consider the matter outside this structure. It limits our imagination and
directs us toward particular results,5 9 Thus form-to-form tracing has
come to be regarded as natural while causal tracing-because it does not
involve the following of a particular asset and its exchange product-has
come to be seen as unprincipled. The examination of the underlying
normative justification for substituting title presented below suggests
that this perception is ironic.
Those who have spoken favourably of legal fictions and related
obfuscatory devices have emphasized the role of such in developing the
law prior to the invention of more sophisticated justificatory concepts.60
Fuller likened fictions to scaffolding: they are necessary in construction
but should be discarded after the erection of the building as they serve
only to obscure.61 Yet Fuller's own emphasis on the relationship of
fictions to axiomatic premises underlying the law suggests that there is
liable to be real reluctance to eliminate such devices. Contrivances of
this type allow a legal culture to avoid the rejection of values which it at
times violates and yet holds to be fundamental. 62 They will not be lightly
cast aside and in the long term their effects may be pernicious.
57 See, for example, A. Ross, "Ti-Tfi" (1957) 70 Harv. L Rev. 812 at 822-25.
58 See G. Lakoff & M. Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1980) at 3-9, for a discussion of how the manner in which we think about particular problems can
become structured by a habitually used group of related metaphors.
59 Compare J.H. Merryman, "Ownership and Estate" (1974) 48 Tulane L. Rev. 916 at 924.
See also Harmon, supra note 38 at 68-71, for an account of how the fiction of substituted judgment
"seduced" judges and so shaped the development of the law.
60 See, for example, O.R. Mitchell, "The Fictions of the Law: Have they Proved Useful or
Detrimental to its Growth?" (1893) 7 Harv. L. Rev. 249.
61 Fuller, supra note 38 at 70.
62 Compare Calabresi's observations on strategies for dealing with clashes of ideals through
subterfuge in American law: G. Calabresi, Ideals, Beliefs and Attitudes and the Law: Private Law
Perspectives on a Public Law Problem (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1985) at 87-114.
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B. The Normative Basis for Substituted Title
Consider the following fact situation.63 A advances money to B
to invest in securities on A's behalf. Instead, B uses the money to buy
gold and absconds. Following B's capture, A seeks civil redress. B is
now bankrupt and has substantial debts to unsecured creditors. A seeks
a court order declaring that the gold is his property and requiring the
trustee in bankruptcy to deliver it over to A. What is the rationale for
the doctrine of tracing? Why allow a plaintiff to assert a title over
something that he or she had neither owned previously nor purchased
from its former owner? Why not simply give personal relief? As the
example suggests, the principal reason is insolvency.6 4 Plaintiffs limited
to personal relief have to line up with other unsecured creditors
competing for an insolvent's estate. In contrast, granting a proprietary
interest has the effect of removing the assets in question from the pool
available to general creditors. 65 Thus, the primary issue is not the
plaintiff's claim against the defendant. Rather, it concerns the plaintiff's
claim relative to other claimants seeking a share of the defendant's
assets in bankruptcy. This points to the importance of property, not just
for holders of proprietary rights, but also for third parties. Accordingly,
the readjustment of rights to particular assets requires a consideration of
interests beyond those of the parties to the dispute.
What then could be the justification for allowing a plaintiff
priority through tracing? It has long been noted that the restitution
interest is the most compelling of private law claims.66 Where a claim is
based upon the defendant's being enriched as a result of a subtraction
from the plaintiffs wealth, restitution returns the parties to the position
they enjoyed before the enrichment. This was, in Aristotle's view, the
aim of corrective justice.67 This feature of unjust enrichment suggests a
63 This example is based on the facts of Taylor, supra note 2.
64 See R. Goff & G. Jones, The Law of Restitution, 4th ed. by G. Jones, ed. (London: Sweet &
Maxwell, 1993) at 83; and F.H. Lawson with H. Teff, Remedies of English Law, 2d ed. (London:
Butterworths, 1980) at 149.
65 A principle now found in the InsolvencyAct 1986 (U.K.), 1986, c.11, s. 283(3)(a) and (5).
66 L.L. Fuller & W.R. Perdue, "The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages" (1936) 46 Yale
L.J. 52 at 56.
6 7 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, § 5.52, 1132b. It was an indication of the intuitive appeal of
the restitutionary claim that Aristotle attempted to force claims for compensation for injury within
the restitutionary paradigm. Modem scholars, however, recognize that such claims do not share the
correspondence of loss and gain which characterises restitution claims: see, for example, J.L.
Coleman, "Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain" (1982) 11 J. Legal Stud. 421 at 425.
1996]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
basis for giving those bringing restitution actions priority over other
claimants in the event of the defendant's insolvency. The argument is
that according unjust enrichment claims priority will effect corrective
justice between the plaintiff and unsecured creditors. Where the
plaintiffs loss is matched by a corresponding gain in the insolvent
defendant's pool of assets available for distribution, to give the plaintiff
priority to the extent of that gain will do no more than return all the
interested parties (i.e., the plaintiff, the defendant, and the creditors) to
the situation that they would have enjoyed were it not for the
defendant's enrichment.68 Thus the Restatement of Restitution justifies
tracing on the basis that creditors "are not entitled to profit because of
the wrongful acquisition of property by their debtor through the use of
the claimant's property."69 Similarly, in Re Hallet, Sir George Jessel
M.R. argued that this should not defeat the legitimate expectations of
the general creditors for, "no human being ever gave credit to a man on
the theory that he would misappropriate trust money and thereby
increase his assets." 70
The swollen assets rationale for tracing adverted to by Jessel
M.R. implicitly recognizes the need to justify priority vis-i-vis general
creditors. It effectively asks whether such creditors would be unjustly
enriched were they able to share in a distribution of the assets in
question.7 1 However, it can provide a justification only as long as it is
true that the enrichment in question has resulted in an increase in the
wealth available for distribution in bankruptcy.
C. Dissonance Between Tracing's Normative Foundations
and the Positive Law
1. The limitations of form-to-form tracing
As mentioned, two bases for giving title to substitutes have
competed for attention. English courts have proved reluctant to
entertain the possibility of awarding proprietary relief in the absence of
68 E.L. Sherwin, "Constructive Trusts in Bankruptcy" (1989) 2 U. Ill. L. Rev. 297 at 364; and
R.H. Maudsley, "Proprietary Remedies for the Recovery of Money" (1959) 75 L.Q. Rev. 234 at
244-45.
69 Restatement of Restitution, supra note 48, comment (e).
70 (1880), 13 Ch.D. 696 at 730 (C.A.).
71 See Sherwin, supra note 68 at 364.
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the identification of specific assets. 72 Similarly, while the swollen assets
theory has its supporters, form-to-form tracing has generally been
favoured in the United States.73 The appeal of swollen assets theory is
easy enough to understand if we engage in a simple thought experiment.
Imagine that we were invited to design a system of priority for private
law claims in a world where there were no practical impediments to
swollen assets tracing. Why would we ever choose a form-to-form
tracing approach? A causal link in the swelling of the assets available for
distribution in insolvency identifies a plausible basis for elevating the
claim of the plaintiff (a rationale firmly rooted in unjust enrichment
theory). In contrast, it is difficult to see that, in itself, evidence of a
transactional link indicates any ground for priority.74
Considered in light of the swollen assets rationale for giving
priority in bankruptcy, form-to-form tracing does not appear well
designed to effect justice. It is under-inclusive-denying a remedy when
underlying considerations of justice suggest that it is merited.75 The
defendant's assets might have been increased as a result of a deprivation
of the plaintiff despite the plaintiffs inability to point to a transactional
link between his or her property and assets currently forming part of the
defendant's estate. An example is the use of traceable assets to pay a
due debt. The net effect of this transaction is that the defendant
continues to be enriched at the plaintiff's expense. Moreover, if the debt
would, in any event, have been paid using other assets, the pool of assets
available for distribution in bankruptcy continues to be swollen as a
result of the defendant's unjust enrichment. Nonetheless, because
subsequently the plaintiff will be unable to point to a transactional link
between the plaintiffs property and any particular asset held by
defendant, the use of traceable assets to discharge a debt extinguishes
the plaintiff's tracing claim. Form-to-form tracing is also
over-inclusive-giving a remedy when it is unmerited. For example, this
method tends to give inadequate recognition to the efforts of the
72 The recent Privy Council decision in Re Goldcorp, supra note 51, provides a restatement of
the orthodox position. The majority judgment delivered by Mustill L.J. suggests that the
controversial obiter dictum of Templeman L.J. in Space Investments Ltd v. Canadian Imperial Bank
of Commerce Trust Co., [1986] 1 W.L.R. 1072 (P.C.), favouring a less rigid approach to proprietary
relief will not gain authoritative approval. For a discussion of the English law on this question, see
Goff & Jones, supra note 64 at 99.
73 See Osterle, supra note 48 at 189.
74 See Walt & Sherwin, supra note 5 at 951.
75 The analysis and terminology derives from P.S. Atiyah & R.S. Summers, Form and
Substance in Anglo-American Law: a comparative study of legal reasoning, legal theory, and legal
institutions (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987) at 13.
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defendant in acquiring the new asset. 76 Thus form-to-form tracing
provides for proprietary relief even though the defendant may have
dissipated wealth or labour in order to acquire the assets in question so
that, in net terms, it cannot be said that his or her estate is enriched at
the expense of the plaintiff.77 For these reasons form-to-form tracing
appears to provide a rather blunt instrument with which to implement,
legitimate policy objectives.
2. Form-to-form tracing as a second-best solution
Some commentators have defended form-to-form tracing by
focusing on the limited capacity of the law to implement the policy goals
being pursued in this area.78 According to this view, in such a context
the question should be whether the particular link required to establish
ownership is an effective means of securing the policy objective in
question. From this perspective, some argue that courts do not have
effective means of identifying causal links between a plaintiff's loss and a
defendant's pool of assets. In practice, causal tracing is liable to be too
arbitrary and unpredictable. Consequently, in an imperfect world,
form-to-form tracing may be the best substitute for swollen assets
tracing.
There is undoubtedly something to this argument. Yet, as a
defence to the law as it now stands, it is ultimately unconvincing. While
it is probable that a full-blooded swollen assets approach would be too
difficult to administer, we could graft certain modifications onto the
present transactionally driven approach, in order to make our law better
correspond with convincing normative justifications for giving priority in
bankruptcy.79 Two relatively straightforward modifications might
include:
76 See G.E. Palmer, The Law of Restitution, vol. 1 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978) § 2.12 at
157-66.
7 7 Consider the following situation: B steals thing 1 from A and exchanges it with C for thing
2. C then exchanges thing 1 for thing 3 in a transaction with D. Tracing potentially allows A
equitable proprietary remedies against B and C and the right to assert her original title against D. If
A sues C and traces into the product of C's exchange with D, it is clear that C's wealth will not have
been increased to the value of thing 3, for C had to expend wealth in order to buy thing 1 from B.
In these circumstances, to give A property in thing 3 cannot be justified in swollen assets terms.
78 See, for example, Sherwin, supra note 68 at 333.
79 While the swollen assets concept was initially developed to increase the availability of
proprietary relief in situations where form-to-form tracing was not possible, in this context it would
be used to limit relief.
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(1) The award of equitable liens instead of equitable title over
proceeds. These liens would be limited to the value of the asset
originally owned by the plaintiff.8 0
(2) The reduction of the extent to which priority is given to the
plaintiff in recognition of any expenditure that the defendant has made
in the purchase of the asset in question.81
More controversially, the law might impose further limitations
on tracing, based on certain presumptions regarding causation. Such an
approach might, at first sight, appear rather arbitrary. Yet form-to-form
tracing can itself be justified only on the ground that it provides a
reasonable basis for an evidential presumption that the defendant's
assets available for distribution in bankruptcy are swollen by the
enrichment in question. We should, therefore, welcome further
presumptions that, by restricting the scope of form-to-form tracing,
better enable tracing doctrine to effect justice. Such additional
presumptions might involve:
(3) Chronological considerations: just as the law of preferences
in bankruptcy pragmatically determines which transactions are voidable
depending on the time at which they were made, the courts might be
more reluctant to allow substitution of title to confer priority when a
good deal of time had passed. This would reflect a reasonable
assumption that the greater the period that has passed, the less probable
it is that the enrichment in question has increased the assets remaining
available for distribution in bankruptcy.
(4) A consideration of the background of the insolvency: if the
insolvency was due to bad financial management or frivolous personal
spending it will be relatively difficult to infer that the value of the
defendant's estate available for distribution in bankruptcy has been
increased as a result of the enrichment gained at the plaintiffs expense.
On the other hand, if the individual or enterprise was otherwise in a
good financial state when insolvency was brought on by a single event,
such as a large tort action or a natural disaster, the case may be
different. In this instance, it may be reasonable to infer that the value of
the pool of assets available for distribution has been increased and that
the claimant has a sound basis for prevailing over general creditors.
Thus, even if considerations of expediency dictate that
form-to-form tracing ought to remain a precondition for proprietary
8 0 See Goff & Jones, supra note 64 at 97.
81 Supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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relief, additional restrictions should be imposed where they can
efficiently mitigate the failings of a rigid form-to-form approach.
D. An Illustration of the Dangers of Formalism: The Enforcement of
Consensually Created Tracing Rights
Concepts utilized in legal discourse to hide the dissonance
between the functional law and axiomatic premises concerning property
do affect the substantive law. This is apparent when one considers the
jurisprudence on tracing into proceeds in the context of reservation of
title agreements. In Aluminium Industrie Vaassen BV v. Romalpa
Aluminium Ltd.,82 it was held that the seller could, utilizing tracing
principles, reserve title, not only to goods in the possession of the buyer,
but also to the proceeds of those goods. The courts have suggested that,
if the terms of the contract are such that the buyer is a fiduciary in
respect of the proceeds, then the seller may assert ownership over them
pursuant to normal tracing principles. Reservation of title clauses
effectively allow sellers to have security in sales transactions, without
having to register.8 3 "Proceeds" clauses allow what is in effect an even
more comprehensive security interest. Despite the function of these
agreements, English jurists are reluctant to characterize them as
unregistered securities.8 4 This may have significant consequences for the
82 [1976] 1 W.L.R. 676 [hereinafterRomalpa].
83 See R.J. Adhar, "Romalpa's Empire, the Reception of Reservation of Title Clauses in New
Zealand" [1993] L.M.C.L.Q. 382 at 384.
84 This can be contrasted with the approach taken by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code of the United States, which provides that reservation of title clauses are security interests and
limits their effect to providing security: see ibid. at 384. The question as to whether the reservation
of title is a security under English law has seen various authors providing their own definitions of
what a security interest is and then announcing whether or not these agreements fit the definition:
see F. Oditah, Legal Aspects of Receivables Financing (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1991) at 5.
Oditah, at 90-94, taking a functional approach, cogently argues that these agreements can quite
reasonably be regarded as security agreements under English law. However, most English
commentators disagree. Goode argues that, because a security must be conferred and not retained,
reservation of title is not such a device: see R.M. Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Sectrity, 2d
ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1988) at 5. Generally functionalism is resisted: see M.G. Bridge,
"Form, Substance and Innovation in Personal Property Security Law" (1992) J. Bus. L. 1. A striking
example of this is Gerard MeCormack's comment that "the 'Crowther Committee on Consumer
Credit' observed that distinctions between one type of transaction and another are drawn on the
basis of legal abstractions rather than on the basis of commercial reality" in the context of a defence
of a formalist approach: see "Reservation of Title-Past, Present and Future" [1994] Cony. & Prop.
Law. (n.s.) 129 at 135. McCormack is apparently unperturbed by the fact that the Committee's
comment was intended as a criticism.
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buyer's creditors, providing that goods and proceeds which are the
subject of such clauses are not available for distribution in the event of
the buyer's bankruptcy.
The acceptance of tracing in this context follows from the
perception that it involves the following of a continuing title rather than
a remedy for unjust enrichment. This perception encourages a
"proprietary" analysis of the retention of title issue according to which
the parties are free to make what provisions they will for the passing of
title. According to this analysis, if the parties provide that title is
retained in the proceeds, so be it.8S The reified notion of a continuing
title results in the conclusion that these agreements involve the seller
retaining a single title, rather than the buyer granting an interest that will
crystallize when the proceeds are obtained. This may be contrasted with
German jurisprudence which concludes that any attempt to provide for
ownership over proceeds must be treated as a charge.86
Title can be retained on various terms. Often these will go
beyond the mere provision of security over the goods sold. Indeed,
terms providing that title only passes when all debts due to the seller are
met ("all moneys" clauses) have been accepted by the House of Lords.8 7
More controversial are "proceeds" clauses which purport to allow sellers
to assert title over the proceeds of sale. Where the buyer is a retailer,
such proceeds will of course generally be greater than the price at which
the seller supplied the goods. Moreover, the effect of the recognition of
"all moneys" clauses is that this title may be asserted and the proceeds
thus removed from the insolvent's estate, even when substantial
payments have been made on the purchase price so that the money owed
by the buyer is considerably less than the sum of the proceeds. Thus, the
effect of the reservation of title contract may actually exceed that of a
security.88 The enforcement of these contracts represents a recognition
85 R.M. Goode, Proprietary Rights and Insolvency in Sales Transactions, 2d ed. (London: Sweet
& Maxwell, in association with Centre for Commercial Law Studies, 1989) 101; and R. Bradgate,
"Retention of Title in the House of Lords: Unanswered Questions" (1991) 54 Mod. L. Rev. 726 at
728.
86 R. Serick, Securities in Moveables in German Law: an outline (Deventen Kluwer, 1990) at 3,
61, and 137. It is, however, worth noting that German law does not demand the registration of
personal property security interests.
8 7 Armour v. Thyssen Edelstahhverke AG, [1990] 3 All E.R. 481 (H.L.).
88 Ironically, where parties make efforts to limit the effect of the contract to security so that,
for instance, the extent of the seller's title is limited to the contract price, or title is transferred as
the price is paid, may increase the likelihood of a court holding that they have created an
unregistered security. Thus a formalist approach encourages reservation of title agreements which
maximize injustice to third-party creditors. See, for example, Re Weldtech Equipment Ltd., [1991]
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of the right of buyers and sellers to make terms prejudicing the buyer's
general creditors.89 Little thought has been given to the issue of whether
this prejudice is legitimate. At the moment, the authorities on this
question are in a state of disarray, generally turning on the issue of
whether the contract creates a charge.90
Further philosophical meditation on the question of what
amounts to a charge could be avoided if it were recognized that there is
no legitimate reason for allowing tracing in this context. It has been
assumed that the capacity to transcend exchange transactions and
continue in substitutes is a natural feature of title, the alienation of
which the owner is at liberty to control. A different conclusion would
result if substituted title was understood to be an unusual remedy
designed to fulfil particular objectives. As the interest conferred by
tracing has been reified, some jurists have lost sight of the normative
rationale for the practice. A consideration of sound policy justifications
for allowing substituted title indicates that allowing sellers unlimited
power to "retain title" over proceeds is unsatisfactory.
V. RETHINKING PROPERTY: BEYOND THE CONVENTIONAL
PARADIGM
A. The Transformation of Property in American Legal Thought
The notion that private law was based on immutable principles
of property and freedom of contract exercised great influence in
American legal thought in the latter part of last century and up until the
New Deal. The notion of the common law being based on legal
principles rather than the pronouncements of particular courts found
B.C.C. 393 (Ch.D.), where Hoffman J., at 395, in striking down a clause, placed emphasis on the
statement "this transfer takes place only for securing our claims against the purchaser."
89 Problems arise when it is assumed that the common law should allow a laissez-faire
approach despite the existence of interventionist regulation in the form of the institution of
bankruptcy. In this context, bankruptcy creates a strange set of incentives for the parties. Solvent
buyers may be relatively unconcerned as to how their estate might be divided in the event of their
bankruptcy. A buyer may be unperturbed that certain third party creditors will be prejudiced, as the
institution of bankruptcy ensures that the buyer's liability to them will be suspended. Consequently,
buyers are likely to be prepared to give effective priority away for very little consideration. Thus it
cannot be assumed that the cost of such agreements to the creditors will be reflected in the price
asked by the buyer, and that the creditors are not prejudiced in the long run. In order to protect the
interests of third parties, we should be prepared to place restraints on parties' ability to negotiate
the retention of title.
90 McCormack, supra note 84 at 132-35.
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expression in Story J.'s judgment in Swift v. Tyson.91 Story J. concluded
that, when resolving a commercial dispute, the federal judiciary was not
bound by determinations on the common law made by the judiciary of
the state in which the action arose. Instead, the federal courts were to
apply "general principles of the common law." 92 That the inviolability of
private property and the freedom of contract were fundamental
constitutional rights was made apparent in the "substantive due process"
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court in cases such as Lochner v. New
York. 93 This edifice was crumbling just as the Restatement of Restitution
emerged in 1937, presenting its formalist vision of tracing.94 That year
the Supreme Court, in West Coast Hotel v. Parish,g5 retreated from its
vision of substantive due process. The following year Swift was
overturned in Erie RR v. Tomkins.96
Indeed, property had already been stretched beyond the
breaking point in both constitutional and common law. The creation of
new forms of intangible property and the characterization of contractual
rights as property encouraged a move beyond the paradigm of property
as rights in a particular object.97 The objects of property increasingly
came to be understood as everything that had exchangeable market
91 41 U.S. 1 (1842) [hereinafter Swift].
9 2 See Horwitz, supra note 13 at 245.
93 198 U.S. 45 (1905) [hereinafterLochner]. In Lochner, the Supreme Court concluded that a
statute restricting working hours in bakeries was in breach of the Fourteenth Amendment as a
violation of the liberty of contract. In the other landmark decision of this era, Adkins v. Children's
Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), a minimum wage for women was struck down for the same reason.
See, for example, J.W. Ely, The Guardian of Every Other Right: A Constitutional History of Property
Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) at 101-118; and M.J. Horwitz, The Transformation
of American Law 1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy, (New York: Oxford University Press,
1992) at 145-51.
9 4 Supra note 48.
95 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
96 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
97 K.J. Vandevelde, "The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the
Modern Concept of Property" (1980) 29 Buff. L. Rev. 325. According to the New Hampshire
Supreme Court, "[a] refusal to pay a debt is an injury to the property of the creditor": see Thompson
v. Androscoggin River Improvement Co., 54 N.H. 544 at 552 (1874). Property reasoning was also
used to overcome the third party beneficiary rule: see Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859)-making
the defendant promisor a constructive trustee of the benefit of the promise for the third party
beneficiary. See also A.J. Waters, "The Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third Party
Beneficiary Rule" (1985) 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1109 at 1196.
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value.9 8 However these developments were difficult to reconcile with
the traditional premise that property implies the absolute protection of a
thing. The equation of property and value meant that a person who had
title over something might lose exclusive right to that thing if another
added value to it. Yet this would not always be the case. Entitlement
would depend upon a moral assessment of the behaviour of the
parties-a fact which emphasised that entitlement did not result from
value alone.9 9 Moreover, it was often implausible to regard the
protection conferred in respect of intangibles as absolute.lOO
Something similar was occurring in "takings" jurisprudence.
Here, the Supreme Court extended the notion of property by embracing
the concept of "regulatory takings," whereby a claimant was entitled to
compensation because the value of his or her land had been reduced,
even where that land remained physically unchanged.lOl However, at
the same time, the Court recognized that, unless it was going to tie the
hands of the state completely, not every regulation which impacted on
the value of someone's land could be categorized as a taking.1 02 Yet,
there was no obvious place to draw the line. What constituted a taking
was, in the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, "a question of degree;" a
matter of policy rather than law.1 03
The role of property in formalist legal thought was attacked by
the legal realists.104 Influenced by Hohfeld's analysis of property, not as
a unitary concept of absolute ownership but as a bundle of divisible
rights,105 the realists accelerated a process which has since been
98 See, for example, Swayne J. dissenting in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 36 at
127 (1872); Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890); and Pitney J.'s majority
opinion in International News Service Ltd. v. Associated Press Inc., 448 U.S. 215 (1918). See generally
Horwitz, supra note 93 at 145 and 203.
99 See, for example, Vandevelde supra note 97 at 339 (discussing development in the law of
accession).
100 1bid. at 341.
101 See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
102 Ibid. at 416, Holmes J.
103 Ibid. For a more recent statement of this understanding, see Brennan J.'s judgment in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York (City of), 438 U.S. 104 at 128 (1978).
104 See, for example, R. Hale, "Rate Making and the Revision of the Property Concept"
(1922) 22 Colum. L. Rev. 209 at 213; A.A. Berle & G.C. Means, The Modern Corporation and
Private Property (New York: Macmillan, 1962) at 333-39; Cohen, supra note 47 at 814-17; and K.
Llewellyn, "Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond" (1938) 15 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 159 at 165-72.
105 W.N. Hohfeld, "Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning"
(1913) 23 Yale LIJ. 16, continued in (1917) 26 Yale L.J. 710. For the importance of Hohfeld's
analysis to the American concept of property, see Vandevelde, supra note 97, and Honvitz, supra
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characterised as the "disintegration of property." 106 That the classic
understanding of property has lost much of its hold in American legal
culture is apparent when one examines decisions which raise the issue of
the redistribution of property rights. In contrast to the English Court of
Appeal in Shelfer,107 the New York Supreme Court in Boomer v. Atlantic
Cement,10S despite finding an actionable nuisance, was prepared to
refuse an injunction and limit the plaintiff to damages. The Court was
not perturbed by the notion that by so doing it was expropriating the
plaintiffs property rights. Similarly, in contrast to the approach of the
House of Lords in Gissing,109 a number of states have developed
remedies for the reallocation of property upon the breakdown of
relationships akin to marriage.1 10 Once again, these courts have not
regarded this as a usurpation of the legislative function. A New Jersey
Supreme Court decision, State v. Shack, III provides an example of the
modern American attitude toward property. There, adopting a view
previously expressed by an academic, Weintraub J. commented: "[a]n
owner must expect to find the absoluteness of his property rights
curtailed by the organs of society, for the promotion of the best interests
of others for who these organs also operate as protective agencies."112
While the classic understanding of property still exerts an
influence on the American legal imagination, 13 its force is muted in
comparison with its role in English law. It has long since become
obvious in American law that property need not involve rights to a
specific material object nor necessarily be absolute.
note 93 at 145.
106 T.C. Grey, "The Disintegration of Property" in J.R. Pennock & J.W. Chapman, eds.,
Property (New York: New York University Press, 1980) 69 at 81. See also B.A. Ackerman, Private
Property and the Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977) at 26-27.
10 7 Supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
108 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
10 9 Supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
110 See, for example, Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 at 112 (Cal. 1976); and Pickens v. Pickens,
490 So.2d 872 (Miss. 1986).
111 277 A.2d 369 (1971).
112 Ibid at 373, citing a passage from R.R. Powell, The Law of Real Property, vol. 3 (Albany,
N.Y.: M. Bender, 1949), para. 493-94.
113 See Nedelsky, supra note 9 at 244; J.W. Singer, "The Reliance Interest in Property" (1988)
40 Stan. L. Rev. 611 at 634. A good example is Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATVCorp., 458
U.S. 419 (1982). In Loretto, the Supreme Court held that all physical invasions of property, no
matter how minor, amounted to takings. The case involved the installation of a television cable on
the plaintiff's roof.
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B. Innovation in Canadian Law
There are also signs that Canadian law is moving beyond the
conventional paradigm toward a more dynamic understanding of
property than can be found in English law. The best indication of this
tendency is the willingness of the courts to consider awarding proprietary
remedies in a wider set of circumstances, while at the same time
suggesting that such relief should be used sparingly.ll 4 Thus, Canadian
courts developed a doctrine providing for the redistribution of property
rights on the breakdown of quasi-matrimonial relationships, a context in
which proprietary relief has been very restricted in English law.115
What is more, Canadian legal discourse displays an openness
about the nature of proprietary remedies that is not apparent in English
jurisprudence. The rationale for proprietary relief is not disguised in a
manner which obscures its substantive effect. An example of this
openness can be found in IAC Minerals.116 In that case, the Supreme
Court of Canada was faced with the argument premised on orthodox
understandings of property as absolute ownership. The defendant
argued that a constructive trust could not be awarded over the profits of
a breach of confidence because to do so would amount to creating a new
property right. In rejecting the notion that the constructive trust could
not be used in this manner, La Forest J. used tracing as an analogy to
destabilize the conventional understanding.11 7  He commented as
follows:
it is not in all cases that a pre-existing right of property will exist when a constructive trust
is ordered. The imposition of a constructive trust can both recognise and create a right of
property. When a constructive trust is imposed as a result of successfully tracing a
plaintiff's asset into another asset, it is indeed debatable which the court is doing.1 18
114 See C.E.F. Rickett, "The Remedial Constructive Trust in Canadian Law: Discordant
Notes in a Performance Better Forgotten?" [1991] Cony. & Prop. Law. (n.s.) 125.
115 Compare Pettkus v. Becker, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834 with Lloyds Bank I'LC v. Rosset, [1991] 1
A.C. 107 (H.L).
116 Supra note 28.
117 This approach is in stark contrast with that pursued by the Privy Council in Reid, supra
note 41 and accompanying text.
118 LAc Minerals, supra note 28 at 676, applied by Cory J. in Peter v. Beblow, [1993] 1 S.C.R.
980 at 1022.
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Similarly, in Rawluk v. Rawluk,119 McLachlin J. noted that "[t]he
doctrine of constructive trust, as it has developed in Canada, is not a
property right but a proprietary remedy for unjust enrichment."120
Abandoning the notion that proprietary relief is imposed in
order to protect a pre-existing right has encouraged the Canadian
judiciary to reflect on the need to mould the availability of proprietary
remedies to meet with the dictates of justice. 121 Thus in LAC Minerals, La
Forest J. concluded that "a constructive trust should only be awarded if
there is reason to grant to the plaintiff the additional rights that flow
from a recognition of a right of property."12 2 The task now is to
establish what amounts to a good reason for awarding proprietary relief.
In her dissenting opinion in Rawluk, McLachlin J. noted that proprietary
remedies may prejudice third parties and it may be that the debate will
increasingly focus on those whose interests have long been neglected in
the jurisprudence of proprietary remedies: unsecured creditors.123 The
groundwork has been laid for a reappraisal of the meaning of property in
the contemporary Canadian common law.124 This gives some hope for a
critical re-evaluation of the legitimate limits of the tracing remedy.
C. Taking Propetly Talk Less Seriously
Tracing discourse serves to obscure the dissonance between the
premise that property involves the enforcement of pre-existing,
inviolable rights and the reality that tracing involves the creation of new
rights and the concomitant readjustment of existing rights. This
phenomenon reflects a desire to preserve the symbol of property as a
neutral boundary delimiting the field of judicial action-a boundary
between the legal and the political.
Tracing represents a decision to give a particular class of
claimants priority in insolvency. Rather than being neutral, it has
119 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 70 [hereinafter Rawluk].
120 Ibid. at 100.
121 See, for example, Sorochan v. Sorochan, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 38 at 47, Dickson C.J.; t-4c
Minerals, supra note 28 at 678, La Forest J.; and Rawluk, supra note 119 at 103-08, McLachlin J. and
92-93, Cory J.
122 Supra note 28 at 678.
123 Supra note 119 at 111.
124 An interest in both the meaning and normative foundations of property is apparent in
recent Canadian jurisprudence: see for example Stevens, supra note 47; and A. Brudner, "The Unity
of Property Law" (1991) 4 Can. J. Law & Jur. 3.
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controversial distributive consequences. Yet these are obscured using
the rhetorical power of property. The decision is justified on the basis
that the plaintiff is the owner of the assets in question. Herein lies the
paradox of tracing. It is the conventional paradigm of property as the
absolute ownership of specific things which makes coherent the notion
of property as a neutral boundary between law and policy. While tracing
departs from this paradigm and thus threatens to undermine the
orthodox understanding of property, the rhetorical strategy employed
disguises this departure and draws upon the symbolic power of property
to insulate the doctrine from controversy.
The notion of property as providing some natural boundary
between law and politics is misconceived. The non-interventionist
premises of the private-ordering paradigm gives it an appearance of
neutrality. However, this is largely an illusion. A system based on
absolute property rights and freedom of contract nonetheless relies on
the use of coercive state power to enforce entitlements.125 Moreover,
notions of consent governing the transfer of entitlements must be
constructed by the courts and reflect notions of distributive justice, 126 or
at least an elaboration of a concept of autonomy, which must draw on a
deeper understanding of the relationship between individual and
state.1 27 Far from being neutral, the private-ordering paradigm reflects
a particular political ideology-a libertarian conception of the private
law.
Tracing is just one example of the reality that in our law property
does not always involve the enforcement of pre-existing legal
relationships and that property is not always absolute.128 Property rules
125 This understanding was central to the American realist movement. Seminal articles
emphasizing this point include R. Hale, "Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive
State" (1923) 38 Pol. Sci. Q. 470; and M. Cohen, "Property and Sovereignty" (1927) 13 Cornell L.
Rev. 8. The same argument was central to John Stuart Mill's political economy: see J. Riley, ed.,
"Introduction" in J.S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy; and Chapters on Socialism (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1994) xvi; see also at 163.
126 See A.T. Kronman, "Contract Law and Distributive Justice" (1980) 89 Yale L.J. 472.
127 See M.J. Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1993) at 101.
128 Other examples include (1) the equitable defence of bona fide purchaser for value (see
F.H. Lawson & B. Rudden, The Law of Property, 2d ed. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1982) at
58); (2) the prevention (by estoppel) of the owner of a good from asserting his or her rights as
against a bona fide third-party purchaser (now codified in the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (U.K.), 1979,
c. 54, s. 21(1) (see Nicholson, supra note 40 at 785-99); (3) the awarding of a constructive trust over
profits made from non-subtractive wrongs (see Reid, supra note 41, where it was held that assets
obtained in breach of fiduciary duty become the property of the principal); (4) the subrogation of
guarantors to secured claims which the creditor has against the principal debtor: see Burrows, supra
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are socially constructed and contingent-whether they deviate from the
private-ordering paradigm or adhere to it. It is better that this choice is
openly acknowledged and exercised thoughtfully rather than obscured in
the abstract conceptual rhetoric which at present characterizes the
discourse of property in our law. Through a more open discourse, a
justificatory theory of property rights capable of explaining departures
from the traditional paradigm might be developed.1 29
VI. CONCLUSION
A survey of the law of tracing is likely to lead one to echo the
unease Maitland experienced when reviewing the area a hundred years
ago. He expressed
great doubts of the convenience of all this. It may be hard that a cestui que trust should
not have "his" property, but is also hard that creditors should go unpaid. Courts of
Equity, which in this matter have had the upper hand, have thought a great deal of the
cestui que trust, much less of the creditors. 130
Maitland's use of inverted commas in referring to the cestui que
trust's claim to "his" property suggests that he viewed the designation of
property in the assets in question as somewhat arbitrary. Yet in tracing
jurisprudence from Lord Ellenborough's judgment in Taylor131 to the
discussion of tracing in the context of Romalpa clauses,1 32 one frequently
encounters patently circular attempts to justify the positive law on the
basis that the plaintiff should be permitted to substitute his title to the
assets in question because they are his property. The conceptualisation
of tracing employed to suppress the conflict between the function of the
note 30 at 85); (5) the protection by means of an equitable lien of an insurer's rights, arising through
subrogation, to settlement moneys paid to an indemnified plaintiff (see Napier & Ettrick (Lord) v.
Hunter, [1993] A.C. 713 (H.L.), and the discussion by Burrows at 81-82); and (6) proprietary
estoppel, at least insofar as it is available to remedy those expectations raised unintentionally by the
defendant rather than those encouraged by promise. Relief in the former situation is contemplated
by the broad approaches favoured by Oliver J. in Taylor Fashion Ltd. v. Liverpool Victoria Trustees
Co., [1982] Q.B. 133 at 147 (Ch.); Deane J. in Commonwealth v. Verwayen (1990), 95 A.L.R. 321
(H.C.) at 347-49; Richardson J. in Gillies v. Keogh, [1989] 2 N.Z.L.R. 327 at 344-47 (C.A.); and the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (1977).
129 An example of an effort to develop a conceptual theory for the qualification of rights of
property using numerous examples found in existing law to support his argument can be found in
Singer, supra note 113.
130 F.W. Maitland, Equity: a course of lectures, A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker, eds., 2d ed.
rev. by J. Brunyate (Cambridge, U.K: University Press, 1969) at 220.
131 Supra note 2, and text accompanying supra notes 32-35.
132 Supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
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remedy and sacred axioms of property has had the effect of burying key
normative issues. We are enslaved by concepts whose primary function
is to obscure. As a result, tracing has never been based upon sound
normative foundations.
What is to be done? It is time to accept that property is socially
constructed and take responsibility for its content. This requires a
willingness to engage in normative argument. The task ahead is to build
on the new awareness apparent in the developments in the context of
proprietary remedies in the last two decades. With a willingness to
explore the legitimacy of departures from the orthodox property
paradigm in the light of existing "anomalies," such as tracing, jurists
could begin to develop what the common law has long lacked: a
justificatory theory for the redistribution of property rights.
